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Abstract 
 
While there is an increasing number of articles and studies identifying lessons from the 
record of UN peacebuilding operations, it is striking how little we know about the UN’s very 
capacity for organizational learning on peacebuilding, and about learning in international 
organizations in general. This pilot study seeks to lay the foundations for an in-depth in-
vestigation of the UN’s record on organizational learning.  
 
Our study is motivated by both, a research and a policy imperative. On the research front, 
studying organizational learning within the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy contributes to 
opening up the “black box” of international organizations. So far, mainstream work in the 
discipline of International Relations (IR) has produced surprisingly few studies on the 
everyday workings of international organizations, let alone their ability to learn. Studying 
organizational learning calls for an interdisciplinary approach bringing together IR (in-
cluding peace and conflict studies), public management and the sociology of organizations. 
This has the potential of advancing conceptual debates within the discipline of IR.  
 
On the policy front, organizational learning provides the missing link that is needed to 
address a key challenge pointed out by the Brahimi Report: the need to reconcile “the 
temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and 
other peace operations activities as core functions of the United Nations”. In other words, 
organizational learning is one answer to the question of how to “bring together the im-
perative of ad hoc missions with the persisting reality of permanent engagement”. Con-
tinuous efforts to learn within and across missions can offer an important antidote to the 
ad-hocism that characterizes the day-to-day operations of peacebuilding. This has also 
been realized by the UN Secretariat, which (supported by a number of key member states) 
has started to intensify its efforts to promote organizational learning on peacebuilding (for 
example through the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit and other recent reform efforts 
promoted by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping). 
Also, member states have tasked the new Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) with 
identifying lessons learned. While the need for learning ranks increasingly high on the 
agenda of officials within the UN system, this realization stands in stark contrast to the 
dearth of knowledge within the UN about its track record on organizational learning. 
 
The study proceeds in four steps. The first step surveys the relevant literature from 
different disciplines and concludes that peace research, IR and organization theory do not 
offer ready-made frameworks for the analysis of organizational learning in international 
organizations. Building on existing research, we identify key elements of a new framework 
starting with a definition of the key term, organizational learning: We define organizational 
learning “as a process of cognitive change through the questioning of the means and/or 
ends of addressing problems. The process manifests itself in the development and im-
plementation of new rules and routines guiding the organization’s actions.”  
 
In a second step, we survey the evolution of the “infrastructure of learning” in the UN 
peacebuilding bureaucracy over the past 15 years. We hold that a number of factors (lack 
of will both within member states and the UN Secretariat as well as the lack of resources 
and appropriate incentive structures) contributed to the very slow recognition of the UN’s  
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learning needs. Major crises (such as the soul-searching after Rwanda and Srebrenica) 
plus the Brahimi Report in 2000 provided a certain momentum that brought the need to  
build up the UN’s learning capacity higher on the agenda. Still, a lot of work remains to be 
done. 
 
In a third step, we present a list of variables that influence learning that need to be consi-
dered in a future in-depth study. This list of factors includes power, organizational culture, 
leadership, human capital, staff mobility, knowledge management systems, as well as 
access to external knowledge. Outlining an agenda for future research, we present a draft 
model of the learning process that includes 1) knowledge acquisition, 2) advocacy/deci-
sion-making, and 3) institutionalization.  
 
We also discuss the substantial methodological challenges future in-depth studies will 
need to overcome. We suggest that future in-depth research concentrate on a single focal 
organization, e.g. the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy around the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO) or the peacebuilding bureaucracies in the US or the UK. Only 
once we have a number of in-depth single case studies can we undertake credible cross-
case comparisons. Second, we suggest to “zoom in” on a number of selected “focal 
issues” from the three areas of security, governance, and welfare (Sicherheit, Herrschaft, 
Wohlfahrt) as well as the area of cross-cutting problems such as coordination of disparate 
actors. In doing so, further research can cover a broad range of peacebuilding tasks while 
at the same time putting a premium on in-depth analysis. Tracking processes of learning 
on concrete issues over a longer time-span allows us to draw more informed conclusions 
than simply focusing on different peacebuilding missions as the unit of analysis. 
 
The current state of research should prevent us from rushing to policy recommendations. 
For example, we need additional research in order to make detailed recommendations on 
options for improving the knowledge management system within the UN peacebuilding 
bureaucracy. Further down the road, this knowledge-practice transfer is a highly desirable 
goal – and one that can count on great interest on the part of the policymakers and officials 
in the UN system as our interviews during the pilot project underlined. 
 
We conclude that given what the often invoked international community has achieved so 
far in the area of peacebuilding, modesty and self-reflection are in order. At the same time, 
this is a call to intensify our efforts at “learning to learn”. As Ernst Haas, the pioneer of the 
study of organizational learning in international organizations, put it: “There is never a final 
lesson to be learned.” Haas’ dictum holds true for both researchers and policymakers. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Eine zunehmende Anzahl wissenschaftlicher Publikationen hat in den letzten Jahren ver-
sucht, Lehren aus der bisherigen Bilanz von UN-Friedensmissionen zu ziehen. Umso 
überraschender ist es, wie wenig wir über die grundlegende Frage der Lernkapazität der 
Vereinten Nationen im Hinblick auf Friedensmissionen wissen. Diese Pilotstudie legt die 
Grundlagen für eine weitergehende Untersuchung institutionellen Lernens in der Peace-
building-Bürokratie der Vereinten Nationen.* 
 
Die Studie verfolgt ein doppeltes Ziel. In wissenschaftlicher Hinsicht trägt die Beschäf-
tigung mit Organisationslernen im UN-Sekretariat dazu bei, die „black box“ internationaler 
Organisationen aufzubrechen und ihr Innenleben als soziale und politische Organisationen 
zu betrachten – ein Thema, das die Forschung in der Disziplin der Internationalen Bezie-
hungen (IB) bislang weitgehend ignoriert. Organisationslernen als Forschungsgegenstand 
erfordert einen interdisziplinären Ansatz aus den Fächern IB (inkl. Friedens- und Konflikt-
forschung), Verwaltungswissenschaft und Organisationssoziologie. Damit ist auch die Aus-
sicht verbunden, konzeptionelle Debatten innerhalb der IB voranzubringen. 
 
In praktischer Hinsicht ist die Lernfähigkeit der UN-Bürokratie der Schlüssel, um – wie 
bereits im Brahimi-Bericht im Jahre 2000 angemahnt – „den temporären Charakter 
konkreter Einsätze mit der offenkundigen Dauerhaftigkeit der Friedenssicherung (…) als 
Kernfunktionen der Vereinten Nationen“ in Einklang zu bringen. Anders ausgedrückt: Wie 
lässt sich die ad hoc-Logik der meisten Missionen mit der Realität dauerhaften Engage-
ments der UN im Bereich Peacebuilding vereinbaren? Eine Antwort auf diese Frage liegt in 
der Rolle institutionellen Lernens. Stete Lernbemühungen können ein wichtiges Gegen-
gewicht zum ad hoc-Charakter der täglichen Peacebuilding-Praxis sein.  
 
Zu diesem Schluss ist auch das Generalsekretariat gekommen. Mit Unterstützung einzel-
ner Mitgliedsstaaten hat es begonnen, Organisationslernen im Peacebuilding-Bereich 
stärker zu verankern, z.B. durch die Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit und die Reform-
bemühungen des Leiters der Abteilung für Friedensoperationen (DPKO), Jean-Marie 
Guéhenno. Auch dem neuen Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) haben die Mitglieds-
staaten eine Rolle in der „Lerninfrastruktur“ des Sekretariats zugewiesen. Der immer 
stärker geteilten Erkenntnis, dass Organisationslernen von zentraler Bedeutung ist, steht 
jedoch ein Mangel an Wissen über die bisherige Lernbilanz der UN und die Entwicklung 
der Lernkapazität gegenüber. 
 
Die Studie ist in drei Schritte gegliedert. Im ersten Schritt erfassen wir die relevante Li-
teratur aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen und kommen zu dem Schluss, dass weder Frie-
densforschung noch IB oder Organisationstheorie einen fertigen Forschungsrahmen für 
die Analyse von Organisationslernen in internationalen Organisationen bieten. Wir müssen 
also ein eigenes konzeptionelles Gerüst schaffen, zunächst indem wir den Schlüsselbe-
griff „Organisationslernen“ definieren. Darunter verstehen wir „einen Prozess kognitiven 
Wandels durch die Infragestellung der Mittel und/oder Ziele des Angehens von Proble-
men. Dieser Prozess äußert sich in der Entwicklung und Umsetzung neuer Regeln und 
Routinen, die die Handlungen der Organisation leiten.“  
                                                 
 
  7 
Im zweiten Schritt stellen wir die Entwicklung der „Lerninfrastruktur“ in der Peacebuilding-
Bürokratie der UN über die letzten 15 Jahre dar. Eine Reihe von Faktoren (fehlender poli-
tischer Wille in den Mitgliedsstaaten und im Sekretariat sowie mangelnde Ressourcen und 
ungeeignete Anreizstrukturen) trugen zunächst dazu bei, dass die Notwendigkeit des Ler-
nens nur sehr langsam erkannt wurde. Große Krisen (Ruanda, Srebrenica) sowie der 
Brahimi-Bericht (2000) brachten die Notwendigkeit zum Ausbau der UN-Lernkapazitäten 
auf die Tagesordnung.  
 
Im dritten Schritt entwickeln wir eine Liste von Faktoren, die das Organisationslernen 
beeinflussen und in weitergehenden Studien zu berücksichtigen sind. Dazu gehören 
Macht, Organisationskultur, Führung, Humankapital, Mobilität des Personals, Wissens-
management sowie Zugang zu externem Wissen. Wir entwerfen zudem ein heuristisches 
Modell des Lernprozesses in drei Stufen: 1) Wissenserwerb, 2) Aushandlung und 3) Insti-
tutionalisierung/Umsetzung neuer Regeln und Routinen.  
 
Es gibt einen deutlichen Bedarf an tiefergehenden Studien, die zahlreiche methodische 
Herausforderungen zu bewältigen haben. Wir schlagen vor, weitere Arbeiten auf eine 
einzelne Organisation zu beschränken, z.B. die Peacebuilding-Bürokratie der UN oder die 
der USA und Großbritanniens. Bevor eine Reihe weitergehender Einzelfallstudien vorlie-
gen, können wir keine belastbaren Vergleiche vornehmen. Zweitens schlagen wir vor, 
ausgewählte Themen aus den Bereichen Sicherheit, Herrschaft, Wohlfahrt sowie dem 
Querschnittsbereich (z.B. Koordination unterschiedlicher Akteure) zur Analyse heraus-
zugreifen. Dadurch können weitere Studien einen hinreichend breiten Ausschnitt von 
Peacebuilding-Aufgaben untersuchen und gleichzeitig den Schwerpunkt auf eine gründ-
liche Analyse legen. Wenn wir Lernprozesse zu konkreten Themen über längere Zeit 
verfolgen, können wir besser begründete Schlüsse ziehen als aus einem einfachen 
Vergleich verschiedener Missionen als Analyseeinheiten. 
 
Angesichts des derzeitigen Forschungsstandes wäre es voreilig, bereits Politikempfeh-
lungen abzugeben. Weitere Forschungsanstrengungen sind erforderlich um z.B. Vor-
schläge zur Verbesserung des Wissensmanagements in der Peacebuilding-Bürokratie der 
UN zu entwickeln. Zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt ist uns der Wissenstransfer in die Praxis 
ein wichtiges Anliegen – und eines, das nach den Erfahrungen unserer Interviews im 
Rahmen des Pilotprojektes auf großes Interesse bei Politikern, Diplomaten und UN-
Mitarbeitern stößt. 
 
Die Erfolgsbilanz der internationalen Gemeinschaft bei Peacebuilding-Projekten gibt An-
lass zu Bescheidenheit und Selbstkritik – und ist ein dringender Aufruf, „das Lernen zu 
lernen“. In den Worten von Ernst Haas, des Pioniers der Erforschung institutionellen 
Lernens in internationalen Organisationen: „Lernen ist nie beendet.“ Haas’ Diktum ist für 
die Wissenschaft ebenso gültig wie für die Politik. 
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1. Introduction1 
 
Historians might well look back on the year 2006 as a decisive year in the history of the 
United Nations’ peacebuilding operations. In mid-2006, the UN Peacebuilding Commission 
became operational, giving formal recognition to the central importance of peacebuilding 
for the world body. At the same time, the number of personnel deployed in what are 
officially still called “peacekeeping” missions reached new record highs. Already starting 
from an all-time high of 85.000 at the beginning of the year, it hit the 100.000 mark in the 
fall of 2006. With the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations predicting a 
rise to about 140.000 soldiers in the year 2007, there seems to be no end to growth.2 
 
The year 2006 also offered a number of stark reminders of the difficulties and trappings of 
the complex and intrusive peacebuilding operations that have come to dominate the UN 
peace and security agenda. East Timor, which had been widely regarded as a success 
story, reverted to violence. This forced the return of international forces and raised 
questions about the UN having prematurely shifted attention and resources away from the 
country before a real stabilization was achieved.3 The situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) proved to be shaky during the elections, and observers raised pointed 
questions about what the achievable medium-term strategic objectives of external involve-
ment could and should be. In Afghanistan, the UN mission faced a rapidly deteriorating 
security environment. As the UN Secretary-General emphasized in his report to the 
Security Council, the country “finds itself in the midst of a new crisis. A third of the country 
is racked by violent insurgency. The situation […] is unlikely to improve in the near future 
and the prospect of further deterioration cannot be excluded.”4 In Kosovo, the “most 
intensive mission ever, receiving more international money, staff and effort per local 
person than any mission before or since”5, the security situation was better but prospects 
of moving towards settlement looked bleak. In October 2006 UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari 
expressed his increasing frustration: “Even if we sat at the negotiation table for the rest of 
my life, I don't think the parties would move in the negotiations.”6 In Lebanon, many 
observers voiced grave doubts as to whether the revamped UNIFIL mission had a chance 
of succeeding. And this is all without even mentioning the situations in Iraq and Darfur.  
 
In light of these developments, it is not surprising that in both political and academic 
discussions, serious doubts about the viability of peacebuilding missions have been raised. 
In both the United Kingdom and the US, there is a rising domestic backlash against military 
engagement abroad. In Germany, it will probably take the first instance of German mass 
casualties for a thorough national debate on how and why “our freedom needs to be 
defended in the Hindukush”7, the Congo and Lebanon. In the academic debate, Michael 
Barnett attacks the Western peacebuilding agenda that in his view seeks to create an 
“ideal society” defined by the rule of law, markets and democracy. Castigating “liberal  
                                                 
1  A longer version of this study (Benner, Thorsten, Andrea Binder and Philipp Rotmann (2007): Learning to Build 
Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework. GPPi 
Research Paper Series No. 7.) is available at http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPiRP_ LearningTo 
BuildPeace_Feb2007final.pdf. 
2  Johnstone (2006a); UN DPKO (2006). 
3  ICG (2006). 
4  UN Secretary-General (2006). 
5  King and Mason (2006: X). Kosovo received twenty-five times as much money and fifty times as many troops on a 
 per capita basis than Afghanistan.  
6  Deutsche Presseagentur (2006). 
7  As stated by then-German Minister of Defense, Peter Struck, in 2001 to justify the post-9/11 intervention in Afghanis-
 tan. 
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peacebuilders” for doing “more harm than good”, he takes the lack of institutional and 
cultural requisites for liberal statehood as a starting point to lay out his counter vision of 
“building a republican peace”.8 Along similar lines, David Chandler castigates the often 
invoked international community for not clearly recognizing the inherent limits and contra-
dictions of the “neo-Wilsonian ideals of exporting democracy”9. Taking the same critique 
even further, William Bain argues that it is sheer “folly” to think the West is capable of 
running other peoples’ states and societies by means of a benevolent despotism called 
“transitional administration”.10 At the other end of the debate, authors such as Iain King and 
Whit Mason draw opposite conclusions from the undeniable problems on the ground. They 
agree that we need a fundamental re-thinking of both our “institutional infrastructure and 
strategic approach.”11 But rather than abandoning complex and intrusive peacebuilding 
missions, they call for increased resources: “Remedying the deep-rooted problems of post-
conflict societies requires more robust instruments and longer time horizons […]”.12 
 
Obviously, there is considerable disagreement over which lessons to draw from the mixed 
track record of peacebuilding for future strategy. The purpose of this study is not to take 
sides in this debate. Rather, we take a step back and investigate the UN’s capacity for 
drawing and applying lessons in the first place. While there are an increasing number of 
articles and studies offering lessons learned, all too often the UN appears poised to 
reinvent the wheel and repeat its own mistakes. This observation is at least as old as the 
early calls from over ten years ago for an institutional capacity for learning – which makes 
it all the more surprising how little we know about the UN’s capacity for organizational 
learning on peacebuilding, and about learning in international organizations in general.  
 
This pilot study seeks to lay the foundations for an in-depth investigation of the UN’s record 
on organizational learning. Our study is motivated by both a research and a policy impe-
rative. On the research front, studying organizational learning within the UN peacebuilding 
bureaucracy contributes to opening up the “black box” of international organizations. So 
far, mainstream work in the discipline of IR has produced surprisingly few studies on the 
everyday workings of international organizations, let alone their ability to learn. Studying 
organizational learning also calls for an interdisciplinary approach bringing together IR 
(including peace and conflict studies), public management and the sociology of organi-
zations. This has the potential of advancing conceptual debates within the discipline of IR. 
 
On the policy front, organizational learning provides the missing link that is needed to 
address a key challenge pointed out by the Brahimi Report: the need to reconcile “the 
temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and 
other peace operations activities as core functions of the United Nations”13. In other words, 
organizational learning is one answer to the question of how to “bring together the impe-
rative of ad hoc missions with the persisting reality of permanent engagement”14. Conti-
nuous efforts to learn within and across missions can offer an important antidote to the ad-
hocism that characterizes the day-to-day operations of peacebuilding. This has also been 
realized by the UN Secretariat, which (supported by a number of key member states) has 
started to intensify its efforts to promote organizational learning on peacebuilding (e.g.  
                                                 
8  Barnett (2006). 
9  Chandler (2006). 
10  Bain (2006). 
11  King and Mason (2006: X).  
12  King and Mason (2006: X). 
13  United Nations (2000: XIII).  
14  Thakur (2006: 44). 
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through the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit and other recent reform efforts promoted by 
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping). Also, member 
states have tasked the new Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) with identifying lessons 
learned. While the need for learning ranks increasingly high on the agenda of officials 
within the UN system, this realization stands in stark contrast to the dearth of knowledge 
within the UN about its track record on organizational learning.15 
 
A note of caution is in order: As a first cut at the issue, this pilot study can only aspire to lay 
the foundations for further in-depth research on organizational learning within the UN 
peacebuilding bureaucracy. We chose our research design for this pilot study accordingly. 
The current state of the research does not allow for a testing of hypotheses. Rather, our 
retroductive research design uses both deduction (from the theoretical literature) and 
induction (from the empirical record) in order to distill different factors that influence 
learning. Furthermore, it is important to point out that our goal is not to gather the ten 
crucial lessons learned on peacebuilding. Rather, we take a step back to analyze the UN’s 
very capacity to draw these lessons with a view to identifying the factors that promote or 
hinder organizational learning.  
 
Our study proceeds in four steps. First, we present a brief survey of the relevant literature 
with the goal of developing a framework for the analysis of organizational learning. We 
start with the literature on peacebuilding operations, go on to take a look at the broader 
literature on IR and international organizations before moving to organizational theory in 
sociology, public management and business administration. We conclude that none of the 
relevant disciplines offers a ready-made framework for our purposes. We thus take the first 
step toward developing our own conceptual framework by providing a definition of orga-
nizational learning to guide our subsequent empirical explorations. We also briefly discuss 
methodological issues informing our choice of a research design using retroduction 
(chapter 2). Second, we survey the development of the UN’s “infrastructure for learning” on 
peacebuilding over the course of the past 15 years (chapter 3). Finally, we present con-
clusions for both a research and a policy agenda. Drawing on the literature reviewed in 
chapter 2 and our own empirical findings, the research agenda presents the initial attempt 
to draft a model of the learning process and an overview of the factors that influence 
learning. The policy agenda focuses on the crucial issues the UN needs to take into 
account when trying to improve its infrastructure of learning as well as its learning record 
(chapter 4).  
                                                 
15  This is a view shared by all of the UN officials we interviewed in New York in April 2006.  
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2. Conceptual Foundations: In Search of a Framework 
 
In the first part of this chapter we present a brief survey of the three areas of research that 
could inform the study of organizational learning on peacebuilding: the literature on multi-
dimensional peacebuilding missions; the literature on international institutions and organi-
zations within the discipline of IR; and organization theory and the approaches of organiza-
tional learning within this theory. Rather than providing an exhaustive overview of these 
very extensive areas of research, we review the literature with the goal of identifying 
building blocks for a research framework that could be applied to organizational learning 
on peacebuilding in the UN. In the second part, we present a crucial starting point for such 
a framework: a definition of organizational learning in international organizations. 
 
Before embarking on these two steps, a brief clarification of our use of the term 
“peacebuilding” is in order. 
 
 
2.1 Terminological Primer: What is Peacebuilding? 
 
Our study operates in an area marked by significant terminological proliferation and 
confusion. Therefore it is essential to clearly define the terms used in this study. We take 
“multidimensional peacebuilding” (short: peacebuilding) missions to include both civilian 
and military personnel mandated to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting 
in a country emerging from war. “Transitional administration” is a special case of peace-
building, while “peace operation” is a more general term comprising diplomatic peace-
making, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding (Schneckener, 2005; Paris, 
2004: 38). A number of different tasks are associated with peacebuilding that can be 
clustered in the areas of security, governance and welfare (Sicherheit, Herrschaft, Wohl-
fahrt).16 
 
It is important to note that this more recent understanding of peacebuilding goes far 
beyond what the term described in the early 1990s. Within the UN context, peacebuilding 
often referred to diplomatic missions and meditation efforts spearheaded within the UN 
Secretariat by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Today, the two remaining 
“peacebuilding support offices” in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic, 
described by DPA as “forward platforms for preventive diplomacy”, pay tribute to this 
legacy.17  
 
In the late 1990s, peacebuilding increasingly became the term of choice for multi-
dimensional and increasingly intrusive missions with the goal of stabilizing societies and 
states. In the UN context, the term peacebuilding clearly won the competition against the 
terms “state-building” and “nation-building”, which many regard as less politically 
acceptable because they convey greater intrusiveness and a broader political mandate.18  
                                                 
16  See Schneckener and Weinlich (2005); Kühne (2005); CSIS (2002). 
17  The term “peacebuilding support office” for DPA field offices in war-torn countries must not be confused with the new 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) that was established at headquarters in 2006 together with the Peacebuilding 
Commission. With regard to “peacebuilding” as such, the historical discussion in chapter 3 sometimes makes use of 
the old definition when describing the diplomatic peacebuilding activities by the Department of Political Affairs.  
18  Some members of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that presented its report “A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” in December 2004 (United Nations, 2004b) would have preferred the term 
“state-building”. While they regarded the term “state-building” as more to the point, they ended up favoring the term 
“peacebuilding” for the very reason that it was more acceptable politically. Interview, New York, 25 April 2006. 
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Our use of term is not based on any political or normative judgment. Rather, we regard the 
level of intrusiveness of each peacebuilding mission as an open empirical question. 
 
The “peacebuilding triangle” (see Figure 1) illustrates the multidimensional nature of UN 
peacebuilding operations. The triangle distinguishes three areas that are each serviced by 
different branches of the UN system: security, humanitarian assistance, and development. 
The security angle (which comprises both military and police components) is mostly run by 
the DPKO in cooperation with the DPA. In some missions without a UN military compo- 
nent, DPA takes the lead. The humanitarian assistance angle is coordinated by the Office 
of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The development angle is most often 
run by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in conjunction with a host of other 
agencies. NGOs and other private contractors play roles in all three areas.19 All these 
different players operate according to their own logic and principles, leading to a massive 
challenge of coordination in all peacebuilding missions. At the heart of this triangle (at the 
intersection of security, humanitarian assistance and development) is the overall goal of 
building up a society and a state with stable institutions true to the ideals of “good 
governance”. This makes coordination an even more difficult and crucial task. 
                                                 
19  In the field, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) has the lead on security issues. The 
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Resident Coordinator (RC) are mostly the same person to allow for better 
coordination of the humanitarian and development pillars. See chapter 3.3 for a more detailed description of the 
different parts of the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy. 
 
Figure 1: The UN Peacebuilding Triangle 
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With this terminological primer in mind, we move into the first part of this chapter, a brief 
survey of the relevant literature for the study of organizational learning on peacebuilding. 
We start with an overview of the empirical research on peacebuilding operations. We then 
move on to the more conceptual literature on international organizations and IR theory in 
general before taking a look at the literature in organizational theory (or better: organi-
zational theories), which is fed by the sociology of organizations, public management and 
business administration.  
 
 
2.2 Research on UN Peacebuilding Operations 
 
In recent years, in accordance with developments in UN practice, research has increa-
singly moved from a focus on traditional peacekeeping to a focus on peacebuilding.20  
 
One strand of this research has focused on the normative and legal basis for multi-
dimensional peacebuilding missions – especially those that de facto and/or de jure take 
over large parts of the governance functions in a territory.21 Since our study is not 
concerned with the overall normative questions related to complex peacebuilding, this 
strand of research is only relevant to the extent that it highlights concrete problems of 
accountability in multidimensional peacebuilding missions.22 A large number of smaller 
studies focus on individual missions23 or certain aspects of peacebuilding (e.g. security-
sector reform).24 In the context of our project, these studies will be helpful as background 
material for analyzing learning in different issue areas.  
 
Among the analyses aiming at a more comprehensive look at the peacebuilding record, 
five recent book-length studies stand out. The works by Simon Chesterman (2004), 
Richard Caplan (2005a) and James Dobbins et al. (2005) all build on multi-year research 
projects on transitional administration as a special form of multidimensional peace-
building.25 These studies identify many of the crucial tasks and areas associated with 
peacebuilding: public order/internal security, civil administration, economic reconstruction, 
political institution-building, judicial reconstruction and dealing with the past. They also 
point to some of the cross-cutting challenges such as effectiveness, exit strategies and the 
overall inconsistencies between liberal ends and illiberal means. Another important work is 
the book by Roland Paris (2004) who, based on his reading of the peacebuilding record in 
11 cases, advances his prescription of a particular policy mix putting a premium on building 
institutions: “institutionalization before liberalization” (IBL). The most comprehensive 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of UN peacebuilding operations is the recent “Making 
War and Building Peace” by Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis.26 Doyle and Sambanis’ 
main assertion is that “while the UN is very poor at ‘war’, imposing a settlement by force, 
[it] can be very good at ‘peace’, mediating and implementing a comprehensively negotiated  
                                                 
20  For a good overview see Schneckener (2005) and Kühne (2005), Ferdowsi and Matthies (2003) and also Cousens 
and Kumar (2001). Likewise, the seminal volume by Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2001) on international conflict 
management in its latest edition devotes more than half a dozen chapters to peacebuilding. For a critique of 
peacebuilding research see Paris (2000). 
21  For a recent contribution see Bain (2006). 
22  See, for example, Caplan (2005b). 
23  See, for example, Rubin (2006); Rathmell (2005); Philpott (2006); Knaus and Martin (2003); Jones (2006). 
24  See, for example, the latest special issue of International Peacekeeping on security-sector reform edited by Brzoska 
and Law (2006); on law and public order cf. Jones et al. (2005). 
25  See Chesterman (2004) distilling the results of a project by the International Peace Academy; Dobbins et al. (2005) 
presenting the results of a RAND study; and Caplan (2005a) which builds on an earlier Adelphi Paper (Caplan, 2002). 
26  Doyle and Sambanis (2006), building on Doyle and Sambanis (2000). 
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peace.”27 They regard international capacities, local capacities and level of hostility as the 
key factors for the success of peacebuilding missions.  
 
These five major studies exhibit two traits that are characteristic of the broader research on 
peacebuilding. First, these studies analyze UN peacebuilding missions without opening up 
the “black box” of the UN Secretariat and agencies to take a close look at the workings of 
the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy. The absence of theoretically informed and empirically 
rich studies of the different organizations involved in UN peacebuilding is a striking gap in 
the literature.28 Second, these studies do not focus on issues of organizational learning. 
While there are a few anecdotal observations such as Chesterman’s conclusion that 
learning “has not […] been one of the strengths of the United Nations. A senior Secretariat 
official describes this as an unwritten rule that ‘no wheel shall go un-reinvented’”29, we lack 
any systematic analysis of the gathering and application of lessons learned within the UN 
peacebuilding bureaucracy.30  
 
We now turn to the general literature on IR/international organizations as well as organi-
zational theory/organizational learning in order to gather building blocks for a conceptual 
framework that allows us to analyze organizational learning in the UN peacebuilding 
bureaucracy. 
 
 
2.3 Research on International Organizations and IR theory 
 
The past 25 years in particular have seen a flourishing of research on international institu-
tions within the discipline of IR. At the same time, however, there has been a growing 
disconnect between mainstream research on international relations, research on inter-
national organizations and research on the UN. Today, there is a rich and theoretically 
diverse body of literature dealing with the creation, functioning and effects of international 
institutions.31 Much of the focus of the past quarter century has been on international 
regimes and (more recently) on networks and partnerships in global governance. Formal 
international organizations, which in the first decades after 1945 were at the heart of 
research as a “manifestation of what was ‘new’ about post-war international relations”32, 
have been sidelined in theoretically interested work. International organizations as 
everyday international bureaucracies were, as the late Susan Strange observed, a “great 
yawn”.33 Excellent overviews of the study of international organizations notwithstanding,34 
there have been very few theory-driven studies of international organizations and the UN in 
particular. It is only recently that international organizations are being re-discovered as  
                                                 
27   Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 5). 
28  Notable exceptions are the study by Durch et al. (2003) on the implementation of the Brahimi Report and the recent 
article by Johnstone, Tortolani and Gowan (2006). The new “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations” also pro-
mises to be an important source for facts on peacebuilding missions (Johnstone, 2006). On the UN secretariat in ge-
neral, see Dicke (1994); Fröhlich (2005), and Benner (2006). 
29  Chesterman (2004: 256). A former senior UN official made a similar observation in an interview in Cambridge, MA, 4 
November 2004. 
30 The only exception is a recent study by Rainer Breul (2005) which presents a first cut at the issue. Breul’s study is a 
diploma thesis at the University of Constance. Breul focuses on a single mode of organizational learning where crisis 
is the single important “trigger”. The study by Julian Junk (2006), also a diploma thesis at the University of Constance, 
is another attempt at bringing together the literature on peacebuilding with that on public administration. In this context 
see also the articles by Irving (2006) and Lipson (2002).  
31  For a general overview see Simmons and Martin (2002) and Sprinz (2003), a good overview on the UN is given in 
Gareis and Varwick (2003) and Weiss (2004). 
32  Simmons and Martin (2002: 193). 
33  Quoted in Barnett and Finnemore (2004: VIII). 
34  See Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch (2003) and also Martin and Simmons (2002).  
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important players in world politics “because they have agency, agenda-setting influence 
and potentially important socializing influences.”35  
 
The following review of the three main strands of theorizing in international relations (neo-
realism, rationalist institutionalism, and sociological/constructivist institutionalism36) shows 
that only one approach holds significant promise as a basis for our study that aims to open 
up the “black box” international organizations.37 
 
Neo-realists do not allow for the independent importance of international organizations in 
the first place. Therefore, in the eyes of neo-realists, any efforts to open the “black box” 
international organizations are futile – why spend time analyzing an organization that does 
not have any relevance in its own right? 
 
Rationalist institutionalists mainly concentrate on the question of why states set up inter-
national organizations to begin with, rather than how they work after their creation. There-
fore, a lot of rationalist institutionalist work is either concerned with why states create or act 
through international organizations38, or with the rational design of international organi-
zations.39 Principal-agent theory as a sub-field of rationalist institutionalism has mostly 
focused on the interests and strategies of the principal actors, in this case states, and what 
states can do to control agents (international organizations/bureaucracies). As a recent 
overview article aptly observes, principal-agent-theory driven work “contains a remarkably 
thin view of agent behaviour.”40 As a consequence, principal-agent theorists have made 
very few direct claims about agent behaviour, which in our context is the behaviour of 
international bureaucracies. More than 20 years ago, Oliver Williamson coined the 
memorable phrase that agents are “self-interest seeking with guile.”41 However, sub-
sequent principal-agent-theory inspired research has not fleshed out or tested this 
assertion. Hawkins and Jacoby (2006: 279) are the first principal-agent theorists to claim 
that “international organizations matter not only because states have designed rules to 
resolve problems, but because those international organizations are themselves inde-
pendent actors and interact strategically with states and others.” However, the tools they 
propose (associating leverage of international organizations with situations in which only a 
small pool of agents exists and high costs are associated with the creation of agents) 
contribute very little to the analysis of long-term processes such as organizational learning.  
 
Only approaches based on sociological institutionalism42 state the explicit goal of analyzing 
the workings of international organizations as international bureaucracies.43 Amid growing  
                                                 
35  Simmons and Martin (2002: 198). 
36  Here we follow the early distinction by Keohane (1993) who differentiates between a rationalistic and a reflectivist 
approach to the study of international institutions. The former is inferred from economics, the latter deduced from 
sociology. The broader assumptions of sociological institutionalism include the importance of impersonal social forces 
as well as the impact of cultural practices, norms, and values that are not derived from calculations of interests (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996). 
37  Contrary to other rationalist IR theories, liberalism as the one major IR theory missing from this discussion does not 
take states but groups within states as its central unit of analysis (Zangl and Zürn, 2003). Consequently, results of 
international politics are explained by constellations of interests of the different dominant groups within states  
 (Moravcsik, 1997). However, this additional level of analysis does not help to open up the “black box” of International 
Organizations, and therefore, to explain learning processes within the UN bureaucracy. 
38  Abbott and Snidal (1998). 
39  Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001). 
40  Hawkins and Jacoby (2006: 277). 
41  Williamson (1985: 30) quoted in Hawkins and Jacoby (2006: 277). 
42  For the purposes of this study we assume that the terms sociological and constructivist institutionalism are ex-
changeable. 
43  According to Keohane (1993), the adherents of sociological institutionalism have neither the coherence nor the self-
confidence of rationalists. Since the time of his writing, it is fair to say that at least the latter problem has improved. 
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interest in the study of international organizations as bureaucracies,44 the recent work of 
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore stands out. Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 3) 
assert the autonomy of international organizations by means of different sources of 
authority:  
 
“We ground our analysis on the fact that IOs are bureaucracies. 
Bureaucracy is a distinctive social form of authority with its own 
internal logic and behavioural proclivities. It is because of their 
authority that bureaucracies have autonomy and the ability to change 
the world around them. Bureaucracies exercise power in the world 
through their ability to make impersonal rules.”  
 
Only by assuming that international organizations have autonomy, albeit limited, can we 
allow for processes of organizational learning to take place. Without autonomy, the 
capacity for learning is not present.  
 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 16) argue that “to understand how international organi-
zations work, we found ourselves turning to theories of organization rather than theories of 
international politics. We were not the first to do this.” In fact, while Barnett and Finnemore 
certainly are not the first, the list of their predecessors is rather short.45 Among them, the 
work by Ernst Haas (1990) on learning in international organizations also stands out. While 
Haas’ work is an inspiration and one obvious starting point for our proposed project, there 
are two caveats: First, his work remained largely typological – Haas in the end did not fully 
open up the “black box” international organizations by tracing learning processes in depth; 
secondly, his understanding of learning processes is very much based on the importance 
of consensually held scientific knowledge on environmental problems, which is much less 
applicable to the field of peacebuilding since there is no equivalent “science of peace-
building”.  
 
 
2.4 Organizational Learning Theory and Organization Theory 
 
In our search for a framework to analyze learning within international organizations we now 
turn to research on organizational learning, a subfield of organization theory.46 Any hopes 
to find ready-made “plug & play” frameworks for the analysis of learning in the UN peace-
building bureaucracy are bound to be disappointed. While organization theory features a 
wealth of interesting and creative approaches, it does not offer tested models tailored to 
the analysis of learning in international bureaucracies. 
 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the field of organizational learning is characterized 
by a high degree of heterogeneity. In the words of two leading contributors to this literature: 
“Research in organizational learning has suffered from conceptions that were excessively 
broad, encompassing nearly all organizational change, from ontological complaints that  
                                                 
44  Cf. Liese and Weinlich (2006); Bauer (2006); Mathiason (forthcoming, 2007). This research builds on older studies of 
international organizations as bureaucracies, for example Cox and Jacobsen (1971). See also the recent studies by 
Fröhlich (2005); Weaver and Leiteritz (2005); Nielson, Tierney and Weaver (2006).  
45  One example is Ness and Brechin (1988). Another interesting attempt is Ansell and Weber (1999), although their 
piece is much less focused on international organizations per se. There are a number of studies on learning within the 
EU context, see for example Jachtenfuchs (1996). 
46  For overviews of the field, see Berthoin Antal et al. (2001) and Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2003). We have reviewed 
but do not include in this overview the approaches on the “learning organization” in management. For a stimulating 
critique of these approaches, see Kühl (2000). 
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organizations cannot learn, and from various other maladies that arise from insufficient 
agreement among those working in the area on key concepts and problems.”47  
 
Second, much of the literature on organizational learning focuses on business organi-
zations, often relying on quasi-Darwinian market forces as explanatory factors while 
critically under-emphasizing the political factors in organizational processes. The analogy 
does not hold; international organizations rarely operate in a market-like environment 
where they are likely to go out of business based on the forces of supply and demand.48 
 
While it does not offer a tailor-made framework for the purposes of our study, we rely on 
elements of the current literature on organizational learning for two purposes: as building 
blocks for our heuristic model of learning, and to deduce hypotheses on the key factors 
that affect learning (chapter 4.1).  
 
To this end, we draw on parts of the more recent literature on organizational learning which 
clearly demarcates itself from earlier approaches on two fronts: on the one hand, the 
traditional understanding of organizations as closed systems in the 1970s gave way to a 
more open concept that allowed for the interaction between an organization and its 
environment; on the other hand, the new scholarly recognition of such interaction remained 
limited to a one-way relation, namely, that the institutional environment determines the 
organization’s goals and the instruments to reach them. On the contrary, more recent 
approaches see the organization and its environment as mutually constitutive.49 
 
In conceptualizing the learning process, we have found further approaches from organi-
zation theory, policy analysis and administrative science to be useful. This includes the 
bounded rationality tradition,50 the “garbage can”,51 “muddling through” and “multiple 
streams”52 models as well as the concept of “organized hypocrisy”53. These models deal 
with decision-making in bureaucracies and can therefore inform our analysis of factors 
influencing the process of organizational learning.  
 
 
2.5 Organizational Learning Defined 
 
The brief overview of the three research fields most relevant for our subject – peace 
operations research, IR and organization theory – has demonstrated that we can neither 
draw on tailored and tested frameworks54 nor on empirically rich studies on organizational 
learning and peacebuilding. Research into organizational learning in international organi-
zations therefore needs to develop its own model, building on different elements from the 
available literature. As a first step toward this end, in the remainder of this chapter we  
                                                 
47  Cohen and Sproull (1991: Editor’s Introduction).  
48  John Bolton, at the time US Ambassador to the United Nations, implied the opposite when stating: “Americans […] 
look at [the UN] as a competitor in the marketplace for global problem-solving, and if it's successful at solving 
problems, they'll be inclined to use it. If it's not successful at solving problems, they'll say, ‘Are there other 
institutions?’” Quoted in Lynch (2005). 
49  Meyer and Scott (1992); Scott and Meyer (1994); Breul (2005); Dingwerth and Campe (2005). This is in line with 
sociological institutionalists considering structure and agency as mutual constitutive, cf. Wendt (1987); Barnett and 
Finnemore (2004); Ulbert (2003). 
50  March and Simon (1958). 
51  Cohen, March and Olsen (1972/1988); March and Olsen (1976). Lipson (2004) applies the concept to peace 
operations. 
52  Kingdon (1984). 
53  See Lipson (2002) for an application to the area of peacekeeping. 
54  March and Olsen (1988); Levitt and March (1988); Hedberg (1981); Huber (1991). 
  18 
develop our definition of the key term “organizational learning” in the context of inter-
national organizations. 
 
There is no generally accepted definition of organizational learning. Organizational learning 
is at present more akin to a widely applied metaphor than to the bedrock of a well de-
veloped research paradigm.55 This reflects both the level of fragmentation of organiza-
tional learning research and the inherent complexity of the learning process itself. Trans-
ferring the concept of learning from the individual level to an organization adds to the 
challenges of clearly defining and operationalizing the concept.  
 
Our definition of organizational learning needs to meet two criteria. First, its basic elements 
must allow for operationalization, rather than remaining at the level of a metaphor. Second, 
to the broadest extent possible, we aim at building on concepts already in use instead of 
creating additional ones. By doing so, we strive to ensure maximum compatibility of our 
research with the few other projects in this area and make use of potential synergies.56 
 
In line with the majority of recent research on organizational learning, we reject both simple 
behavioural stimulus-response models and models that analyze organizations as closed 
systems independent of their environment.57 We hold that:  
 
1. Organizational Learning is a collective process driven by groups of individuals;58 
2. Organizational Learning is a process with a strong cognitive dimension,59 in which 
3. the organization interacts with its environment and that this 
4. manifests itself in the development of new rules and routines. 
 
We therefore define organizational learning as a process of cognitive change through the 
questioning of the means and/or ends of addressing problems. The process manifests 
itself in the development and implementation of new rules and routines60 guiding the 
organization’s actions. Note that we speak of learning only if the negotiations about these 
new rules and routines are significantly based on knowledge. A change of rules and 
routines that occurs solely due to a change in power relations is not included in our 
definition of organizational learning. 
 
Our definition combines the knowledge-based approach of Haas (1990) with that of Barnett 
and Finnemore (2004) who focus on the importance of rules as the basic modus operandi 
of international bureaucracies.  
                                                 
55  Argyris and Schön (1978); Klimecki, Laßleben and Riexinger-Li (1994). 
56  In particular, we are working closely with the related projects on the planning and management of peacebuilding ope-
rations undertaken at the University of Constance. Earlier research by the project team has been published by Blume 
(2004), Breul (2005) and Junk (2006). 
57  For example, Cyert and March (1963). 
58  We take it as a given that individuals in an organization learn – however, learning becomes only consequential at the 
group and organizational levels: “The significance that work groups […] have in organizations means that knowledge 
acquisition by individuals is an indispensable, but usually insufficient, component of organizational learning” (Maier, 
Prange and von Rosenstiel, 2001). Our detailed examination of the learning processes within the UN therefore starts 
at the group level. 
59  Klimecki, Laßleben and Thomae (1999). 
60  According to Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 18), “bureaucratic rules are the standard operating procedures that allow 
the organization to respond more effectively and predictably to environmental demands.” Change of rules generally 
applies to a broad continuum from operational procedures to grand doctrines. 
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2.6 A Word on Methodology 
 
Any mind striving for parsimonious research designs testing clearly delineated causal 
hypotheses must feel a sense of desperation after reviewing the state of the research on 
organizational learning in the peacebuilding bureaucracy. For one thing, organizational 
learning is a complex process that is not directly observable. For another, there are no 
established frameworks for the analysis of learning, let alone robust and testable causal 
hypotheses on what influences organizational learning. Therefore, given the present state 
of research, organizational learning is still more akin to a metaphor than a clearly specified 
scientific concept usable for empirical research. 
 
What some might see as a reason for despair, others might simply regard as a strong 
reminder for the need to be modest on what a first cut at the issue can achieve – as well as 
to choose a methodology that fits the current state of the research. To combine insights to 
be translated from other disciplines with empirical observations on our particular object of 
inquiry – organizational learning in the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy – we found a 
retroductive research design to be best suited.61 Retroduction means that the researcher 
develops a preliminary model through the use of analogies and deduction from theories 
from related fields that fit the observation that is to be explained. A first set of preliminary 
hypotheses is drawn from the model and “fitted” to the empirical reality, i.e. tested to which 
extent it fits the actual field of research. This testing is not to be confused with the testing 
of causal hypotheses but must rather be seen as a much earlier step to develop or adapt 
such hypotheses. With the help of such empirical work new variables might be found, 
others refined or even rejected. After several repetitions of theoretical deduction and 
empirical induction in a spiral process of theory development, the candidate hypotheses 
will be generated with these new and refined variables. 
 
This study seeks to lay the foundations for the application of a longer process of retro-
duction in future in-depth research. In terms of theory-building, our present study needs to 
content itself with a very modest first step: to identify possible factors that influence 
learning from related disciplines and empirical research62. These factors can later be 
refined and worked into hypotheses.  
 
With this in mind, we now turn our attention to the empirical picture. We analyze the 
evolution of what we call the “infrastructure of learning” in the UN peacebuilding 
bureaucracy. In chapter 4 we return to broader conceptual issues and present a first cut at 
a model of the learning process as well as an overview of the different factors that we 
distilled by means of both deduction from the relevant literature and induction from our 
empirical work. 
                                                 
61  Schimmelfennig (1995: 21). 
62 The “case examples” are available in the longer version of this study (Benner, Thorsten, Andrea Binder and Philipp 
Rotmann (2007): Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a 
Research Framework. GPPi Research Paper Series No. 7.), available at http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net/fileadmin/ 
gppi/GPPiRP_ LearningTo BuildPeace_Feb2007final.pdf. 
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3. Evolution of the Learning Infrastructure in the UN 
 Peacebuilding Bureaucracy 
 
“Much has been written in the last few years on post-conflict 
peacebuilding. If even a small portion of that knowledge were 
translated into practice, some of the serial failures of international 
assistance to countries emerging from conflict might have been 
avoided.”63 
 
This chapter presents a brief overview of the development of the infrastructure of learning 
in the UN’s peacebuilding bureaucracy. The peacebuilding bureaucracy refers to those 
parts of the Secretariat that are regularly and officially tasked with managing peacebuilding 
operations. The infrastructure of learning comprises functional units and institutional me-
chanisms dealing with the promotion of learning, e.g. the collection of lessons and best 
practices and their mainstreaming into future operations. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyze the evolution of the infrastructure of 
learning. The limits of such a first-time undertaking based on secondary sources and 
officially available documents are clear. A full-fledged historical analysis is outside the 
remit of this study. It would require in-depth oral history with the key individuals and an 
analysis of internal documents that are not publicly available, in particular since 2000, as 
the renewed surge in peacebuilding activity has produced a multitude of new actors and 
fora. The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide the basic context on how the 
infrastructure of learning evolved. In this first cut, we can only hint at a number of factors 
that are likely to have influenced this development, such as leadership, supporting 
countries, crises, and structural factors. 
 
Taking the initial appearance of the term “post-conflict peace-building” in UN Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” (1992) as a starting point, section 3.1 re-
counts the development of the secretariat’s capacity for organizational learning throughout 
the 1990s. Despite a number of initiatives during these years, real progress was made only 
following the “Brahimi Report” (2000). Section 3.2 summarizes its recommendations on 
learning and their subsequent (non-)implementation. Finally, in section 3.3, we present a 
snapshot of the current learning infrastructure as it presents itself in mid-2006. As much as 
possible, we take into account the new Peacebuilding Support Office that was just 
established in order to strengthen the work of the new Peacebuilding Commission.  
 
 
3.1 The Slow Recognition of the UN’s Learning Needs in the 1990s 
 
“… the United Nations did not have in place, as of the end of 1993, 
proper arrangements for institutional memory [or] to learn from recent 
experience in peacekeeping.”64 
 
When Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his “Agenda for Peace” to 
heads of states in June 1992, his prime concerns were with issues of policy, not  
                                                 
63  Necla Tschirgi quoted in Cutillo (2006: Preface). 
64  From a report prepared by the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN Secretary-General: para. 16). 
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management.65 His call for a larger role of the UN in conflict prevention, peace-making, 
and “post-conflict peace-building” was aimed at decision-makers in member state capitals 
and embassies. However, with the exception of the need for additional early warning and 
preventive diplomacy capabilities, Boutros-Ghali did not spell out any consequences for 
the UN bureaucracy of such an expanded role. Member states provided the requested 
resources for early warning which led to the establishment of the DPA Affairs. Having 
created the DPKO just four months earlier,66 the Secretary-General did not seek any 
further changes in this area. “The established principles and practices of peacekeeping,” 
he wrote in an optimistic tone, “have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years.”67 
 
As it turned out, this belief in flexible adaptation by muddling through was misplaced. The 
result was (as the Office of Internal Oversight Services noted in 1995) a lack of strategic 
capacity and the complete absence of an institutional infrastructure for learning. This 
added to the overall lack of coherence in the evolving area of peacekeeping and peace-
building, a field that was very much in flux during the 1990s and therefore in dire need of 
capacity for analysis and learning. While the key departments, mainly DPA and DPKO, 
wasted too much time on turf fights, adequate capabilities for planning, analysis and 
learning were hardly forthcoming anywhere in the bureaucracy. A first, small step in this 
direction was taken in DPKO in the mid-1990s. 
 
3.1.1 A First, Small Step: The Establishment of DPKO’s Lessons Learned Unit 
When Kofi Annan took over the DPKO in March 1993, the explosion of demand for peace-
keeping had begun to take a toll on the Secretariat. In the previous year alone, there had 
been a fivefold increase in troops and a twofold increase in missions.68 Just three days 
after leaving his post and moving to DPA, Annan’s predecessor Marrack Goulding told an 
academic audience at the University of Oxford that “the departments concerned […] need 
to be strengthened if they are to have the planning and command and control capability to 
support operations on the scale currently deployed.”69 
 
This slowly but steadily growing awareness led Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to give 
more attention to pressing management issues. In his June 1993 implementation report on 
the “Agenda for Peace” Boutros-Ghali called for an in-depth investigation of the start-up 
phase of peacekeeping operations, a request granted by the General Assembly.70 This 
independent investigation became the driving force for establishing the first embryonic 
elements of a learning infrastructure within DPKO. The investigation produced a progress 
report in 1994 and a final report in 1995.71 In terms of learning, the “progress report [made] 
clear [that] the United Nations did not have in place, as of the end of 1993, proper arrange-
ments for institutional memory [or] to learn from recent experience in peacekeeping.”72 
 
In March 1994, the Mission Planning Service in DPKO began to test a first “lessons 
learned mechanism” aimed at the systematic collection of end-of-mission assessments by  
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senior mission staff.73 The Secretariat stepped up its call for more resources over the 
course of the year. In doing so, it took advantage of the explicit show of support for the 
investigation’s progress report from both the General Assembly and the Special Committee 
on Peacekeeping Operations. The latter, in particular, strongly supported better analysis 
and planning capabilities within DPKO.74 In a November 1994 report on the command and 
control of peacekeeping operations to the Special Committee, the Secretary-General 
pushed for budget increases to fund a broad range of planning and analysis tasks at 
DPKO, including a Lessons Learned Unit.75  
 
In 1995, as the final report of the independent evaluation mandated in 1993 was issued, 
new resources were finally forthcoming.76 In April 1995, DPKO’s Lessons Learned Unit 
was established as part of the Planning Division, Office of Planning and Support, with only 
two positions: a Head of Unit and one research assistant. However small and understaffed, 
the unit was the first of its kind in the UN’s peacebuilding bureaucracy. 
 
3.1.2 The Late 90s: Stalemate in the Battle for Resources 
During the second half of the 1990s, the general context for peacekeeping changed. After 
the failures of Rwanda and Srebrenica, demand for UN operations began to fall and the 
previous enthusiasm within the organization gave way to self-doubt and soul-searching. 
Developing countries pushed through a decision to send home all military personnel that 
(for the most part Western) governments had provided to the Department free of charge to 
offset staffing shortages. In this context, there was not much progress to be made for the 
learning infrastructure at DPKO. 
 
From its inception in 1995 until about 2001, DPKO’s Lessons Learned Unit was for the 
most part sustained by voluntary contributions. Up to 1997, for example, a trust fund 
provided up to four additional posts as well as other resources to the unit, mostly paid for 
by the Ford Foundation and the governments of Sweden and Germany.77 In the first one-
and-a-half years of its existence (until its first serious funding crisis), the unit issued a total 
of five reports: three on field missions (UNOSOM in Somalia, UNAMIR in Rwanda, UNMIH 
in Haiti), one on “multidisciplinary peacekeeping” in general, and one on the implemen-
tation of lessons learned.78 
 
As Kofi Annan took office as Secretary-General in 1997, donors indicated they would not 
foot the bill indefinitely for what the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) had, in 
1995, called a core task of the strategic management of peace operations. As part of a 
larger package of funding requests, the Secretary-General asked for the replacement of 
the four donor-funded posts with three posts from the peacekeeping budget.79 In July 
1997, despite Annan’s explicit call to fund DPKO at a level “that reflects the Department’s 
real personnel requirements”,80 member states denied most of his requests but 
encouraged resubmission of a budget proposal specifically for the Lessons Learned Unit.  
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The Secretary-General did just that, only to get permission to redeploy up to three existing 
staff to the unit but not to create any new posts.81 
 
By March 1998, two of the three authorized posts for the Lessons Learned Unit had been 
redeployed within DPKO from the Mission Planning Service, leaving the unit with a total of 
four regular staff, plus changing resources from external donors. In trying to elevate their 
standing, both the Lessons Learned and the equally under-funded Policy and Analysis Unit 
were reassigned from the Office of Mission Support to the Office of the Under-Secretary-
General.82 Subsequently, the two units were merged to form the Policy Analysis and 
Lessons Learned Unit, with a total of 17 posts by 1999, most of which were still funded by 
external donors.83 
 
Not surprisingly, given this resource base, the unit continued struggling to fulfill its purpose. 
Throughout 1999 and 2000, member states and external observers alike criticized DPKO 
for its failure to better incorporate past “experiences […] into peacekeeping policy and 
planning than has been the case to date.”84 The Special Committee on Peacekeeping  
Operations observed that the unit had failed to “develop guidelines and standard operating 
procedures, as well as [to promote] the sharing of best practices among missions.”85 
 
While the efforts to build up a learning infrastructure at DPKO stalled in the late 90s, the 
DPA only made very slow progress on this front despite the growth in responsibilities 
attributed to it by Annan’s 1997 program of reform.86 Alongside a push for better funding of 
its conflict prevention functions, DPA undertook a number of efforts to strengthen strategic 
planning and coordination. In 1998, under the tenure of Kieran Prendergast, the DPA 
established a Policy Planning Unit along with a Conflict Prevention Team, both of which 
were to provide policy guidance on preventive action.87 Until today, however, the Policy 
Planning Unit has not been able to set up a lessons learned capacity even for its core 
business.88  
 
Also in 1998, DPA made plans for a small Peacebuilding Unit tasked to “assist mission 
planning and support for peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding support offices, special 
political missions and peacemaking/diplomatic activities. It would also build and maintain a 
peacebuilding information system and establish contacts for the department with academic 
institutions and research centers.”89 The unit which was guided by the definition of peace-
building as preventive diplomacy prevalent at the time suffered much the same fate as 
DPKO’s Lessons Learned Unit: after being denied regular funding in 1999, the idea 
remained dormant until the Brahimi Report reanimated the project in 2000. To improve 
coordination at the inter-departmental level, Kofi Annan’s reforms introduced an Executive 
Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS) including all Under-Secretaries-General and 
some of the Assistant-Secretaries-General working on issues of peace and security, 
chaired by the head of DPA. Without any stable funding for even a small secretariat and  
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hamstrung by inter-departmental feuding, the Secretary-General found the ECPS, four 
years later, still “not living up to its full potential.”90 
 
 
3.2 The Brahimi Report and Beyond: Learning at the Center of Management 
Reforms in Peacebuilding 
 
“The work of DPKO’s existing Lessons Learned Unit does not seem to 
have had a great deal of impact on peace operations practice, and the 
compilation of lessons learned seems to occur mostly after a mission 
has ended.”91 
 
“Under the current practices there is no process for elevating certain 
practices to ‘best practices’ and subsequently incorporating them both 
in the field and at headquarters …”92 
 
Following years of stagnation in the number of peacebuilding operations and decline in 
field personnel and DPKO support staff alike, a new and rapid surge in demand for UN 
peace operations began in June 1999. Quite unexpectedly, member states called for some 
of the largest and most ambitious missions to be deployed to Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra 
Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – missions that were much more 
complex and intrusive than most of what the UN had been engaged in before. To avert a 
renewed overstretch of DPKO’s support capacities93 and avoid repetition of the UN’s 
mistakes in handling the situations in Rwanda 1994 and Srebrenica 1995, the Secretary-
General convened a high-level panel to suggest improvements to the management of UN 
peace operations. The panel produced what became known as the “Brahimi Report”, 
named after the panel’s chairman, former Algerian foreign minister and UN Under-
Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi. 
 
The panel did not come up with entirely new concepts. This was not necessary as one of 
the main intentions was to distill once more the numerous ideas that had been proposed in 
previous years but failed to attract sufficient funding and political will on the part of the 
member states. On a conceptual level, the report officially broadened the notion of peace-
building to bring it closer to the realities of post-conflict state-building: “to reassemble the 
foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something 
that is more than just the absence of war.” The following list of tasks is both comprehend-
sive and intrusive, from electoral assistance and human rights education up to the “training 
and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform.”94 Among the operational 
suggestions in the Brahimi Report were three initiatives to improve the learning infra-
structure in the peacebuilding bureaucracy.95 These were: 1) a new “strategic analysis” 
capacity at DPA for the assessment and evaluation of peacebuilding activities, 2) the 
introduction of Integrated Mission Task Forces to oversee field operations, and 3) re-
vitalizing DPKO’s Policy Analysis and Lessons Learned Unit.  
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These three proposals encountered a similar fate as the panel’s overall recommendations. 
They were only partly met with support from the member states. The eminence of the pa-
nelists and the strong support of the Secretary-General provided the necessary momentum 
to secure much-needed funding to implement at least key elements of the recommenda-
tions, including the creation of 191 new posts for DPKO.96 But for the most part the history  
of the implementation of the recommendations demonstrated “that the doctrinal lessons of 
the Brahimi Report will only be learnt when reinforced by realities on the ground.”97  
 
The three recommendations relating to the infrastructure of learning are a case in point: 
the first recommendation failed, the second was implemented with mixed success, and the 
third has, after some time, led to considerable activity to promote organizational learning at 
DPKO. In the following sections, each will be treated in turn. 
 
3.2.1 Creating a Strategic Analysis Capacity at DPA: The EISAS and PBU Disaster 
“[T]o strengthen the permanent capacity of the UN to develop peacebuilding strategies and 
to implement programs in support of those strategies,”98 the Brahimi Report advocated that 
an ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) be established to support 
the Executive Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS).99 The new body was to pull to-
gether a number of disparate policy and analysis units scattered throughout the secreta-
riat, including the policy analysis part of DPKO’s recently merged Policy Analysis and 
Lessons Learned Unit, its Situation Centre, and DPA’s Policy Planning Unit. The plans for 
EISAS also included the creation of a new Peacebuilding Unit (PBU).100 
 
Facing instant opposition from member states who felt that too strong an early warning and 
“intelligence” capacity of the United Nations might compromise their sovereignty,101 the 
Secretary-General pulled back and requested a much smaller version of EISAS and a se-
parate Peacebuilding Unit to be established as part of DPA.102 In May 2002, the request 
was finally denied. According to well-placed observers, the PBU’s failure must be regarded 
as collateral damage from the political storm that had broken out over the EISAS con-
cept.103 
 
3.2.2 Integrated Mission Task Forces 
As a second proposal relevant to the learning infrastructure, the Brahimi panel proposed 
the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) as a management tool to 
bring all actors relevant for the recently introduced “integrated missions” together at the 
headquarters level. An IMTF would be assembled for every specific multidimensional 
peace operation to coordinate its planning and management at a relatively high level of 
seniority. Starting well ahead of a formal mandate of the Security Council and operating 
throughout the life cycle of its mission, the group would play the role of a crucial hub 
through which all information and decisions would flow. Its inclusiveness and decision-
making authority would go a long way to improve the implementation of past lessons 
learned. Ideally, the IMTFs would also help to coordinate the collection of lessons learned 
during and the end of missions.104 
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After five years, the result is mixed at best. According to one recent study, IMTFs “have 
been established on only a limited number of missions and they performed below ex-
pectations.”105 In more detail, according to another assessment, they “succeeded in 
resolving technical issues of day-to-day coordination and policy differences” but, “there 
was still an overall incoherence in the international response mechanism”.106 In particular, 
observers point to a persistent lack of cohesiveness among the UN agencies, between the 
UN agencies and a number of regional organizations, and between these entities and 
some of the major powers involved in the process. 
 
While the IMTF doctrine has been revised, refined, and adapted for each UN mission since 
its first application in the planning of UNAMA for Afghanistan in 2001/02, a fundamental 
tension persists: while representatives from the political, humanitarian and development 
agencies on the ground feel that DPKO planners fail to adequately take their local ex-
perience and perspectives into account, DPKO staff complain that UN country teams often 
“are unwilling to adapt to the new realities.”107 Lacking effective integration with processes 
of learning, a study team found that even in 2005, mission design in the cases of Liberia 
and Sudan reflected “the inclinations and predilections of senior mission management, with 
little if any substantive reference to best practices, concepts of integration or modern 
management practices.”108 They conclude that the IMTF process has been undermined by 
a lack of clear reporting lines and decision-making leverage, that it has not been suffi-
ciently country focused, and that it had only provided a very loose form of integration.109 
 
3.2.3 The Further Development of DPKO’s Lessons Learned Unit 
Having been appointed on 1 October 2000 with an explicit determination to implement the 
Brahimi Panel’s recommendations and “professionalize” DPKO’s organizational culture, 
the new Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno made “change management” 
one of his personal priorities.110 Instead of following the Brahimi panel’s recommendation 
to move the Policy Analysis and Lessons Learned Unit into the Office of Operations – 
internally considered the most understaffed, bureaucratic and change-resistant part of 
DPKO111 – he kept the unit as part of his immediate office.112 As member states finally 
provided new resources for the department in 2001, the unit was strengthened and once 
more renamed into Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU). 
 
However, despite the additional staff and funding, it took more than two years and several 
changes in personnel to improve the standing of the unit. In 2003, while one external study 
still complained about the lack of an effective learning capacity at the department,113 the 
appointment of David Harland as head of the unit led to a turnaround. A Harvard-educated 
career UN official who, in 1999, drafted the organization’s damning report on the Srebre-
nica massacre, Harland could build on a broad range of previous assignments in various 
departments and in the Bosnia and East Timor operations. Nonetheless, it took another 
two years until a plan to systematically collect end-of-mission reports and other lessons 
learned was put into practice.114  
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3.2.4 The High Level Panel and the 2005 Summit 
In 2005, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change again took up the need 
for an institutional home for the cross-cutting task of peacebuilding. In the meantime, the 
topic had been prominently featured in the recommendations of two critical reviews of the  
UN’s record in peacebuilding.115 Together with the proposal of an intergovernmental 
Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate sustained peacebuilding activities by the UN, a 
Peacebuilding Support Office became part of the Secretary-General’s subsequent report 
“In Larger Freedom”. After the endorsement of heads of state at the 2005 World Summit, 
both bodies were mandated in December of that year.116 
 
Issues of learning, however, did not come up in the High-Level Panel report, nor did the 
state of DPKO’s support infrastructure for peacebuilding operations. This might prove a 
crucial omission given the renewed surge in demand for new operations that is set to 
increase the number of troops by nearly 50% in 2006 (including a 17,000-strong Darfur 
mission). The strain of having planned for new deployments in East Timor, Lebanon and 
Sudan alone in the month of August 2006 is already showing, and prompting new 
questions whether the infrastructure and procedures available at DPKO are up to the 
number and size of operations requested by member states.117 
 
 
3.3 A Snapshot of the Current Infrastructure for Learning 
 
At the time of this writing in the autumn of 2006 during the final months of Kofi Annan’s 
tenure as Secretary-General the Secretariat and DPKO in particular remain under 
significant restructuring and change. In many ways, the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy 
remains a moving target for analysts. In the following, we present a snapshot of the 
peacebuilding bureaucracy, as of mid-2006. 
 
In organizing the complex array of departments, agencies, field offices, and intergovern-
mental bodies for the purpose of an analysis of organizational learning, we distinguish 
between three levels of operation facing different kinds of internal logics and external 
constraints: 1) the inter-governmental level (Security Council and General Assembly with 
the respective committees, the governing bodies of the various specialized agencies, 
member state representatives); 2) the headquarters level (UN Secretariat and the 
secretariats of the various specialized agencies), and 3) the field level (peacebuilding 
missions; see Figure 2 on page 29). In the following discussion, we focus on the UN 
bureaucracy at the head-quarters and field levels. We also discuss on how this peace-
building bureaucracy interacts with bodies at the intergovernmental level and how it 
interfaces with non-state actors such as NGOs and think-tanks.118  
 
3.3.1 The Learning Infrastructure Within the Peacebuilding Bureaucracy 
Under the political mandate of the Security Council, formal authority over peacebuilding 
operations rests with the Secretary-General. Through the Under-Secretary-General hea-
ding the DPKO, field leadership on the ground is delegated to Special Representatives of 
the Secretary-General (SRSGs). Still, the Secretary-General’s Executive Office may be 
involved in the political aspects of higher profile operations. In particular during the start-up  
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and transition phases of a mission, this includes mandate negotiations, marshalling troops 
and resources, and defining the mission’s relationship to the host country and other inte-
rested parties. 
 
DPKO is in charge of planning, logistical support, and day-to-day operational management 
of peacebuilding missions. The department’s senior officers are also the key points of 
contact at the headquarters for mission leadership in the field. Even as the Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA) is directing a few smaller operations without military or police com-
ponents, DPKO’s experience and expertise in the logistics of peace operations as well as 
the organizational muscle provided by a much larger staff give the department de-facto 
primacy on most operational issues.119  
 
Other departments and agencies such as the UN family’s humanitarian and development 
actors frequently contribute their particular operational strengths to specific missions but 
until now are usually not involved in the overall planning and management of operations.120 
However, a number of inter-departmental and inter-agency committees are supposed to 
integrate their perspectives into the planning and management process. Each of these 
suffers from its individual shortcomings: the Executive Committee for Peace and Security 
(ECPS, see section 3.1 above) meets on the level of Under-Secretaries-General, mostly 
confining it to general questions not specific to any mission, and is being led by the head of 
DPA, not DPKO. The Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, in contrast, is much less 
hamstrung by departmental or agency politics but is limited in membership to the 
Secretariat itself. On a mission level, Integrated Mission Task Forces (see section 3.2 
above) are often perceived in other departments as dominated by DPKO.121 Meanwhile, 
the new Peacebuilding Support Office is only beginning to find its role as we write. 
 
Mirroring this distribution of authority in the strategic management of peacebuilding, the 
promotion of organizational learning remains largely with DPKO’s Peacekeeping Best 
Practices Section (PBPS). Like the department, the unit has taken the initiative on wider 
issues of peacebuilding even though its formal authority remains restricted to peace-
keeping as such.122 The Department of Political Affairs, being even more stripped of 
resources than DPKO, never received the necessary funding to set up a Peacebuilding 
Unit, while its Policy Planning Unit does not have any lessons learned capacity even for 
the department’s core tasks.123 UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
(BCPR), in contrast, is better resourced but concentrates on the specific tasks its field 
offices are engaged in. While collecting best practices and lessons learned on, for 
example, UNDP’s electoral assistance work, the BCPR has rarely engaged in learning 
support for peacebuilding more generally.124 
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 Figure 2: The UN peacebuilding bureaucracy 
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The Peacebuilding Best Practices Section at DPKO collects reports and best practice 
proposals from mission staff with the assistance of Best Practice Officers or Focal Points in  
each field mission.125 In addition, the section conducts its own studies (often with the help 
of external consultants), either on missions or with regard to cross-cutting themes that are 
relevant to many current or anticipated missions. On issues that transcend the depart-
mental experience or authority of DPKO, resulting policy decisions are made by inter-
departmental fora to ensure input and ownership of other relevant departments.126 Among 
the recent initiatives by PBPS to support organizational learning on peacebuilding are its 
Knowledge Management Team and the Guidance Project, both introduced in late 2005. 
The Guidance project is tasked to establish a comprehensive body of reviewed and/or 
changed rules on the full range of peacebuilding tasks. The Knowledge Management team 
is expected to improve, in quantity and quality, the gathering of lessons learned and best 
practices from field reports. Concrete learning initiatives within this framework are 
expected to be operational in early 2007.127 
 
Another innovation with potentially significant impact is the newly created Peacebuilding 
Support Office (PBSO) which is tasked, among other things, to “gather and analyze 
information relating to […] best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding 
issues.”128 As the small office was only becoming operational in the summer of 2006, it 
remains to be seen how its learning role will fare in relation to its coordination and support 
tasks vis-à-vis the Peacebuilding Commission. In any case, the office is designed to co-
ordinate general rather than mission-specific peacebuilding policy and to concentrate on 
issues of sustainability rather than immediate crisis management.  
 
The first Assistant-Secretary-General to head the PBSO, Carolyn MacAskie of Canada, 
was a senior choice for the position. While she brings experience from within headquar-
ters, as well as from running the field operation in Burundi to the job,129 some hold that the 
head of the PBSO should rather have more experience with knowledge management. The 
fact that the current head of the PBSO has an inclination to get involved in current ope-
rational issues instead of focusing on knowledge work has only emboldened sceptics 
working to sideline the PBSO. Ideally, the PBSO with its institutional position as part of the 
Executive Office of the Secretary-General and not beholden to the internal logic of any one 
department involved in peacebuilding activities is well suited to play a coordinating role in 
knowledge management.130 It remains unclear whether it can evolve into this role. 
 
On the ground, the capacity for learning is still very much defined by the resources and 
personal leadership of mission management. DPKO is a field-driven department and the 
influence of headquarters to promote the collection of lessons learned is limited or at least 
at the mercy of those responsible for running the mission on the ground. The effectiveness 
of improvements in the organizational infrastructure of learning, like the recently introduced 
Best Practice Officers or Focal Points, is hampered by the fundamental problem of coordi-
nation. The rhetorical and doctrinal move toward “integrated missions” under the leader-
ship of SRSGs who would enjoy line authority not only over peacekeepers, police forces, 
and other DPKO-supplied components but also over the field offices of other UN agencies  
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involved, has not yet been effectively implemented. As a consequence, any inter-agency 
sharing of lessons learned or best practices depends on personal networks and initiative, 
while the official infrastructure of learning covers only the core tasks and components 
under DPKO’s authority. 
 
Being far removed from their understaffed and overworked operations desks in New York, 
mission leadership usually enjoys an exceptional extent of freedom from interference by 
headquarters. A quite different organizational culture in field missions, based on different 
recruiting practices and the demands of the tasks themselves, often adds to the disjoint  
between headquarters and field. As a consequence, it might be easier to learn for indi-
vidual missions, but harder to institutionalize best practices across missions or into 
headquarters doctrine. 
 
3.3.2 Influences of the political and institutional environment 
Within the UN system, there are two important sets of constraining or enabling actors with 
influence on organizational learning in the peacebuilding bureaucracy: on the inter-
governmental level, the principal organs on peace, security and development (Security 
Council, General Assembly), and their relevant subsidiary bodies (Budget Committee, 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, and the new Peacebuilding Commission) 
enable or constrain the freedom of action of the peacebuilding bureaucracy with regard to 
learning and rule change. On the headquarters and field levels, other bureaucratic actors 
within the UN system – mainly DPA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNHCHR, and UNDP – operate 
under their own mandates and governance arrangements on certain aspects of peace-
building. While cooperating with DPKO as part of the “integrated missions” doctrine set out 
above, these organizations also cater to different sets of demands and expectations and 
keep their own learning and evaluation structures. 
 
External to the United Nations as such, the World Bank, NGOs, major governments, and 
think-tanks each play a role for the peacebuilding bureaucracy and its learning capability. 
The particular features of these roles, though in many cases vital for particular processes 
of learning at headquarters or in the field, are hard to generalize without further detailed 
research. Examples include the considerable and sustained budgetary support to DPKO’s 
learning unit from several European governments such as Sweden and Germany, as well 
as charitable foundations such as the Ford Foundation. The governments of Norway and 
the UK, among others, have funded numerous external studies and conferences in close 
connection to the UN secretariat and with the explicit purpose of compensating for the li-
mited internal resources for such evaluation work. Another such example is the recently 
introduced “Senior Mission Leaders Course” for senior leaders in peace operations, con-
ducted by the German Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF) together with 
DPKO and other member state agencies. Think-tanks close to the Secretariat, like the 
International Peace Academy, the Center for International Cooperation at New York 
University, or the Henry L. Stimson Center have been instrumental in providing intellectual 
support for many of the advances made in recent years – not least in providing much of the 
research staff for the Brahimi and High-Level panels.131 
                                                 
131  Malone and Nitzschke (2004). 
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4. Learning in the UN Peacebuilding Apparatus:  
 Pushing the Frontiers of Research and Practice 
 
“As long as they are carried out by human beings, interventions to put 
weak societies on a more stable footing will never be perfect. […] 
They will continue to suffer from our flawed understanding, ideological 
blinkers, divisiveness, weak will and shortsightedness. But we are also 
capable, albeit inefficiently, of learning from our mistakes. […] Apply-
ing these lessons ultimately depends on political will.”132 
 
What lessons can we learn for the study and practice of organizational learning in the UN 
peacebuilding bureaucracy? In this chapter we present elements of both a future research 
and a policy agenda on peacebuilding and organizational learning. In doing so, modesty 
needs to be our most basic guiding principle. This study has only started to scratch the 
surface of what is a promising area of research and an important concern for policymakers. 
More focused in-depth studies are needed in order to produce more robust research 
findings that can then inform recommendations for policymaking. In light of this, readers 
need to take the following preliminary sketches of agendas for research and practice with a 
grain of salt.  
 
One further clarification is in order in this context: Making the question of organizational 
learning the focus of our research does not presuppose that such learning has frequently 
and successfully taken place. Anecdotal evidence from the available literature points in the 
opposite direction.133 At the same time, we need to take the broader concerns of sceptics 
seriously. Michael Barnett, for example, argues that the bread-and-butter business of an 
international bureaucracy such as the UN, namely determining and operating on universal 
and generalized rules, might not be possible in the case of peacebuilding because of the 
historic specificity of the individual cases. Barnett argues that bureaucratic universalism is 
dangerous: “In order to be the rationalized, efficient actors that they present themselves to 
be, [UN peacebuilding officials] must flatten diversity and ignore contextual variations.”134 It 
should be clear that learning cannot and should not equal the search for a “one-size-fits-all 
template”.135 At the same time, from a policy perspective we hold that ultimately a learning 
organization that revises doctrines and guidelines based on experience and relevant new 
knowledge is a model worth striving for. Only a thorough and sober analysis of the 
successes and (even more importantly) the failures, shortcomings and roadblocks can 
point to promising and realistic policy strategies for getting closer to this model. 
 
 
4.1 Future Research Agenda 
 
Our case examples136 have surveyed a wide variety of instances of learning. We have 
seen both completed and aborted learning processes. We also pointed to instances of “no  
                                                 
132  King and Mason (2006: 263-264). 
133  See chapter 2. 
134  Barnett (2005: 5). 
135  Therefore, any attempts to use “pre-fabricated constitutions” (Benard, 2005) or “Governments-out-of-a-Box” (CMI and 
IPA, 2004; von der Schulenburg, 2005) are of most doubtful promise.  
136 Available in the longer version of this study (Benner, Thorsten, Andrea Binder and Philipp Rotmann (2007): Learning 
to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework. 
GPPi Research Paper Series No. 7.) is available at http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPiRP_ 
LearningTo BuildPeace_Feb2007final.pd 
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learning” when, with the benefit of hindsight, we concluded that the actors did not identify a 
problem even while outside observers convincingly pointed out the need for a new per-
spective regarding the same issue. In addition, we discussed a case of “lessons mis-
applied” as valid lessons from the Kosovo experience were insufficiently contextualized 
and therefore misapplied in East Timor.  
 
Overall, this is a broad spectrum that points to a number of problems that any further 
research in this area must confront and address. First, “no learning” is a typical instance of 
a non-case that can hardly be made visible, certainly not in a reliable way that goes 
beyond accidental selection by external complaint. Second, and more importantly, the 
universe of different forms of learning and the universe of peacebuilding are simply too 
large to design in-depth research studies covering the whole of them. 
 
Instead, it is crucial to concentrate on a particular manifestation of organizational learning, 
like we intend to do with our focus on cognitive change leading to a shift in bureaucratic 
rules. To achieve a degree of similarity between observations, a further research agenda 
also needs a more narrow selection of issues. After all, the entire field of peacebuilding 
offers simply too many instances of diverse learning processes to be a viable object of 
research as a whole. Looking into organizational learning in international organizations, we 
stand only at the beginning of a spiral process of retroduction, combining theoretical pro-
gress with further empirical research, and along the way dealing with new material on both 
fronts.  
 
For now, there are three substantial building blocs for further research that we can take as 
the results of this study’s conceptual review and empirical analysis: 1) a preliminary model 
of the learning process, 2) a set of factors influencing that process, and 3) the choice of an 
appropriate methodology.  
 
4.1.1 A Model of Organizational Learning in International Bureaucracies 
Returning to our basic premise to see learning as a process, we need an initial concept of 
how this process evolves in order to study it – in short, a model. In developing a stylized 
process model of learning in international organizations rather than corporations, we must 
lead traditionally business-focused organizational learning theory onto completely new 
territory. Based in part on the works of Huber (1991) and Crossan, Lane and White (1999), 
our model is designed to trace the learning process in a very general way. In line with the 
requirements of the early stage in the retroductive method, the idea is just to organize the 
concepts that constitute learning. In a subsequent step, the model can be used to organize 
preliminary hypotheses drawn from related theories and observations of the empirical 
reality. 
 
In line with most organizational learning scholars we distinguish different stages of the 
learning process as cognitively driven rule change for heuristic purposes:137 1) knowledge 
acquisition, 2) advocacy/decision-making, and 3) institutionalization. Ideally, the three 
phases would add up to a learning cycle, i.e. the institutionalized rules would be subject to 
continuous review and further learning.138 Our heuristic model does not include  
                                                 
137  March and Olsen (1976); Crossan, Lane and White (1999); Berthoin Antal et al. (2001); DiBella, Nevis and Gould 
(1996). However, our model departs from most models of learning in so far that it understands learning to be a pro-
cess of knowledge-based rule change rather than information processing.  
138  On feedback loops see Argyris and Schön (1978); Haas (1990). 
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assumptions of the factors that influence the learning process, which we will discuss in the 
next section. 
 
1. Knowledge Acquisition: Initially, the organization either actively searches for or 
passively receives knowledge from its environment, or converts its own previous 
experience into knowledge. Potential sources include a field officer’s end-of-
assignment report; a study conducted at the Best Practices Section to actively 
identify ways to solve new problems (or better solve existing ones); or the 
organization’s decision to adopt and incorporate the recommendations of a policy 
paper prepared by an outside think-tank. 
 
2. Advocacy/decision-making:139 After knowledge acquisition, the carriers of know-
ledge spread the word about the new knowledge in the organization and develop 
knowledge-based proposals for new rules. Building coalitions and negotiating the 
relevance of their new knowledge and rule-changing proposals, they try to con-
vince key people to accept their newly acquired knowledge and its implications for 
rule adaptation. In this phase it will be examined how knowledge is formed into 
proposals for new rules and how these proposals gain (or do not gain) momentum 
within the organization. The advocacy stage ends with an authoritative decision on 
whether and how to change the rules. 
 
3. Institutionalization: Once a decision has been taken, it must be codified and 
implemented. The new rules are integrated within the existing body of rules and 
disseminated among concerned units and staff. The learning process is completed 
when the newly made rules are applied. In an ideal learning process the imple-
mentation is followed by an evaluation of the new rule, activating a feedback loop 
and restarting the learning process.  
 
More detailed steps in the learning process can only be made visible by means of applying 
process tracing (see below) to concrete cases. Of course this is only a stylized model 
which does not allow us to make predictions on how different factors influence individual 
processes of learning. It is only a necessary preparatory step for subsequent in-depth 
research on the factors that influence learning. 
 
4.1.2 Influences on Learning 
Determining the relative importance of different factors supporting and hindering processes 
of organizational learning will be at the heart of any future in-depth research. Our study has 
produced some initial observations of potential factors both inductively (from our case 
examples) and deductively (from the literature on organizational learning).  
 
The case examples surveyed in the research project and detailed in a longer version of 
this paper140 show a number of factors that have influenced processes of learning. We saw 
the complex interplay between the bureaucratic and the intergovernmental levels where it 
was fundamentally political power that played an important role in supporting or forestalling 
learning. The negative effects of organizational structure on learning became apparent in 
the bureaucratic politics and turf fights documented in various cases. An interesting dyna- 
                                                 
139 We owe the suggestion for this term to Patrick Stadler (University of Bern). 
140 Benner, Thorsten, Andrea Binder and Philipp Rotmann (2007): Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peace-
building and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework. GPPi Research Paper Series No. 7.);  
available at http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPiRP_ LearningTo BuildPeace_Feb2007final.pdf. 
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mic that merits further attention in subsequent research are the differences between head-
quarters and field levels and the interaction between the two in learning processes. On the 
one hand, learning processes in the field might be less constrained by bureaucracy and 
grand politics than those at headquarters. At the same time, staff in the field often seems 
independent of what are regarded as “the recent management fads” coming out of head-
quarters – the importance of learning being one of them. The day-to-day pressures of 
operating in the field are certainly not conducive to putting a premium on actively contribu- 
ting to learning processes. Staff at headquarters on the other hand has to cater to political 
masters, bureaucratic imperatives and generalize across the whole range of very different 
situations on the ground. The influence of human capital for learning is obvious in the 
impact of staffing levels, recruitment policies and the role of local knowledge in mission 
planning and management. Human capital is also at work in the role of dedicated learning 
support, be it one-time internal evaluations or a permanent infrastructure of organizational 
learning. Access to external knowledge has been recognized as a factor on learning as 
well, as has the role of leadership, particularly by the SRSG personally. This is exemplified 
by the role of the first head of the UNAMA mission in Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, whose 
strong personal leadership together with the high level of political attention and ample 
resources might have provided one of the best possible real-world situations for learning 
short of crisis-induced revolutionary change. 
 
Reviewing the relevant literature, we discovered a multitude of “factors”, “conditions”, 
“antecedents” and “triggers” said to be in one way or another causally linked to learning. 
As of now we lack both a systematization of these variables as well as detailed empirical 
investigations into how they actually influence learning.141 As a first step toward syste-
matization for the purposes of an in-depth follow-up study, we came up with a way of 
organizing and selecting plausible candidates for independent variables that might 
influence one or more stages of the learning process.  
 
In a comparison of factors deduced from the literature and factors induced from the case 
examples and the interviews conducted as part of the pilot project (see Annex 1), we 
distilled eight clusters of potential independent variables that we found to apply to at least 
two different areas of the learning system (the peacebuilding bureaucracy, other UN 
actors, and non-UN actors) and that were supported both deductively by the organizational 
learning literature and inductively by our empirical research (with one exception that is 
strongly supported by our interviews). Table 1 gives an overview of the resulting clusters of 
potential independent variables.  
 
The cluster organizational culture, for example, includes the organization’s decision-ma-
king culture (top down vs. bottom up), its absorptive capacity, its bureaucratic nature, etc. 
Future research needs to determine the most relevant clusters and single out the most 
important independent variables. In contrast to approaches focusing on single dominant 
causes or triggers of learning (most often a crisis),142 we believe that a more fine-grained 
process tracing analyzing different factors that (co-)influence learning has the potential of 
presenting a much richer analysis of organizational learning.143 
 
                                                 
141  Babuji and Crossan (2004); Dodgson (1993); Huber (1991), among others. 
142  See the discussion in Breul (2005), chapter 3.2. 
143  This is underlined by Hannan and Freeman who assert that “organizational outcomes depend heavily on internal 
politics, on the balance of power among the constituencies. When such an organization faces an external problem, 
which action will be taken, if any, depends as much on the coalition structure of the organization as on the 
contribution of alternative actions to organizational survival or growth. In such situations outcomes cannot be easily 
matched rationally to changing environments.” (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 23 quoted in Pierson, 2004: 126)  
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Applicability (cf. Figure 2) 
(and sources) 
Peacebuilding 
Bureaucracy Other UN actors Non-UN actors 
Clusters of potential IVs deductive inductive deductive inductive deductive inductive
Power X X  X X X X 
Organizational culture X X   X     
Leadership X X   X     
Human capital X X   X     
Organizational structure X X   X     
Staff mobility and fluctuation X X X X     
Technical infrastructure for  
knowledge management 
  X          
Access to external knowledge         X X 
Table 1: Clusters of potential independent variables 
 
4.1.3 Methodological Suggestions for Future In-depth Studies 
As discussed in chapter 2, we suggest that future in-depth studies define organizational 
learning, the dependent variable, following Haas (1990) and Barnett/Finnemore (2004) as 
a process of cognitive change through the questioning of the means and/or ends of 
addressing problems that manifests itself in the development of new rules and routines 
guiding the organization’s behavior. Some approaches propose a more complex scale of 
learning (e.g. by distinguishing between simple and complex learning or single-/double-
loop learning).144 We do not think that such fine-grained scaling adds much value at this 
stage of research on organizational learning in international organizations. The scaling of 
our dependent variable is nominal. Instead, we suggest relying on a simple nominal scale 
of “learning” (completion of the learning process) and “no learning” (non-completion of the 
learning process).145  
 
On top of the inherent complexity of organizational learning as a non-observable process, 
any further research will have to deal with a multitude of independent variables or, in other 
words, multiple causality. We make two suggestions for addressing this challenge.  
 
First, we suggest that future in-depth research concentrates on a single focal organization, 
e.g. the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy around DPKO or the peacebuilding bureaucracies 
in the US or the UK. Only once we have a number of in-depth single case studies, can we 
undertake credible cross-case comparisons. 
 
Second, we suggest to “zoom in” on a number of select “focal issues” from the three areas 
of security, governance, and welfare146 as well as the area of cross-cutting problems such  
                                                 
144  For example Nye (1993), Argyris and Schön (1978). In a similar vein, Haas (1990) distinguishes adaptation and lear-
ning. 
145  It follows, of course, that we cannot trace all cases of no learning because processes that never started and rules that 
were never supposed to change cannot be made visible.  
146  “Sicherheit”, “Wohlfahrt” and “Herrschaft” in the terminology used by Czempiel (1981: 198). 
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as coordination of disparate actors.147 In doing so, further research can cover a broad 
range of peacebuilding tasks while at the same time putting a premium on in-depth 
analysis. Tracking processes of learning on concrete issues over a longer time-span allows 
us to draw more informed conclusions than simply focusing on different peacebuilding 
missions as the unit of analysis.  
 
A decision to design future in-depth studies as single case studies using retroduction also 
has consequences for the choice of method.148 Process tracing seems to be the most sui-
table method for future research along the lines suggested in this study. Process tracing 
helps to unwrap the process by which the “initial case conditions are translated into case 
outcomes”.149 The researcher searches for evidence by dividing the process into smaller 
steps and looking for discernable evidence of each step.150 Therefore, process tracing is 
perfectly suited to detect how complex processes such as organizational learning unfold. 
At the same time, by dividing the process into stages – knowledge acquisition, advocacy/ 
decision-making, and institutionalization – and investigating a few different focal issues, 
process tracing helps increase the number of observations. 
 
4.1.4 Challenges and Opportunities of Further Research 
Future in-depth studies hold the potential of breaking new ground both theoretically and 
empirically. Theoretically, they can help develop a framework for analyzing and opera-
tionalizing organizational learning, a concept that until now has largely remained at the 
metaphorical level. Tailoring such a framework to an international organization, they can 
add a political dimension to a field that until now has mostly focused on corporations. In 
doing so, future research needs to continue to bring together approaches from IR with 
organization theory – a literature so far underutilized for both the analysis of peacebuilding 
and the study of international organizations in general.151 At the same time, in-depth 
studies on organizational learning would also help to remedy one theoretical weakness of 
the existing literature on peacebuilding which (according to one prominent observer) has 
“paid relatively little attention to the conceptual foundations of peacebuilding itself, or the 
basic premises upon which these operations are based.”152 
 
Empirically, further studies on organizational learning in international organizations would 
contribute to opening up the “black box” of international bureaucracies153 by means of an 
empirically rich process-tracing of (non)-learning. At the same time, the results promise to 
be relevant for the practice of the respective organization. In the case of UN peacebuilding, 
for example, the policy relevance for the design of learning systems at DPKO and the new 
PBSO is readily apparent (see next section). 
 
Future research should not shy away from taking a closer look at the role of factors that 
are often overlooked in political science research. This includes the issue of leadership. 
While research in IR has produced a wealth of literature in institutionalist, structuralist or  
                                                 
147  For the area of peacebuilding, these categories have been adapted frequently, cf. Kühne (2005); Schneckener and 
Weinlich (2005); CSIS (2002). 
148  Schimmelfennig (1995); Eckstein (1975); Lijphart (1971). 
149  Van Evera (1997: 64). 
150  Cf. Van Evera (1997). 
151  We share this observation and research interest with our partners at the University of Constance who are working on 
peacebuilding in the context of their projects “Administrative Science Meets Peacekeeping and Casualties of the New 
World Order”. 
152  Paris (2004: 4). Paris states that while “the literature on peacebuilding has burgeoned since the end of the Cold War, 
few writers have scrutinized the assumptions that underpin the design and conduct of these operations” (Paris, loc. 
cit.). 
153  See Mathiason (forthcoming, 2007). 
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systemic traditions, it has shied away from the role of leadership.154 It would also be 
desirable for future research not to remain confined to the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy 
but also take an in-depth look at the learning record of other organizations charged with 
similar tasks. Interesting cases for comparison could be other international organizations 
such as NATO or the EU ESDP bureaucracy but also institutions such as the U.S.-/UK-led 
Coalition Provisional Authority.  
 
 
4.2 Future Policy Agenda 
 
In 1993, John Ruggie observed: “The United Nations has entered a domain of military 
activity – a vaguely defined no-man’s land lying somewhere between traditional peacekee-
ping and enforcement – for which it lacks any traditional guiding operational concept.”155 
Ten years later, Simon Chesterman concluded that learning “has not […] been one of the 
strengths of the United Nations. A senior Secretariat official describes this as an unwritten 
rule that ‘no wheel shall go un-reinvented’”156. Many observations in this study support 
these opinions. At the same time, on the basis of the scant evidence available thus far, it 
would be premature and presumptuous to rush to a final verdict on the UN’s learning 
capacity. The current state of research should also prevent us from rushing to policy 
conclusions and recommendations. For example, we need additional research in order to 
make detailed recommendations on options for improving the knowledge management 
system within the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy. Further down the road, this knowledge-
practice transfer is a highly desirable goal – and one that meets great interest on the part 
of the policymakers and officials in the UN system. At this stage, we need to confine our-
selves to a number of observations on the practice of organizational learning in the UN 
peacebuilding bureaucracy.  
 
The analysis of the evolution of the “infrastructure of learning” has demonstrated that the 
UN bureaucracy in recent years has attributed greater importance to mainstreaming the 
gathering and application of lessons into its peacebuilding operations. The current leader-
ship of DPKO seems to have achieved a modicum of success with its efforts along these 
lines. However, both the resources and political will devoted to improving the “infrastruc-
ture of learning” still do not seem to be commensurate to the challenges at hand. The UN’s 
capacity to gather and apply lessons is an important corrective to the ad-hocism that 
characterizes its peacebuilding operations. Since the UN is in this business for the long 
haul, and since (as discussed in the introduction) demand for peacebuilding operations 
seems to be steadily increasing, further investment in its capacity to gather and apply 
lessons learned is all the more urgent. Here the support of member states (such as the 
German support for the Peacebuilding Best Practices Unit early in its existence and the 
ongoing support of the governments of Canada and the UK, among others) can make a 
real difference in the overstretched peacebuilding apparatus. Member states should 
increase their investments into the UN’s infrastructure of learning. Here it is important to 
note that future investment should not be confined to the Peacebuilding Commission. The 
resources available for learning in the relevant departments, most importantly DPKO, are 
much more critical and therefore deserve sustained attention and targeted funding. 
                                                 
154  See Keohane (2005). 
155  Ruggie (1993). 
156  Chesterman (2004: 256). The former senior UN official Sir Kieran Prendergast, head of the Department of Political 
Affairs from 1997-2005, made a similar observation in an interview in Cambridge/MA, 11 April 2005. 
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While funding and resources are critical, it is as important to remember that (as the 
opening quote in this chapter underlines) people are crucial to the business of learning. 
Without motivated, dedicated and able staff, further investment in the infrastructure of 
learning will be without effect. Therefore, UN officials operating under huge pressure in 
tough environments need to have both the incentives and the tools to gather and apply 
lessons. On the one hand, this presupposes an incentive system in career development 
that puts a premium on the contribution of the staff members to the organization’s learning 
capacity. To a large extent, the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy is a knowledge-based 
organization but its current personnel management system does not reflect this. Other 
knowledge based organizations such as management consultancies put strong incentives 
in place in order for their employees to contribute to the collective knowledge base. 
 
In terms of tools, on a very basic level this presupposes linking the expertise of different 
UN officials. DPKO’s Best Practices Section has recently made great efforts to support 
organizational learning on peacebuilding, particularly in the form of its Knowledge 
Management Team and the Guidance Project. The Guidance project is tasked to establish 
a comprehensive body of reviewed and/or changed rules on the full range of peacebuilding 
tasks. Meanwhile, the Knowledge Management (KM) team is expected to improve, in 
quantity and quality, the gathering of lessons learned and best practices. Both initiatives 
were planned in late 2005. Concrete learning initiatives within this framework are expected 
to be operational in early 2007.157 Meanwhile, peacebuilding operations still lack a com-
prehensive database listing the areas of expertise and the track record of the respective 
staff members. However, learning to learn is more than a question of technology. Ulti-
mately, drawing and applying lessons is a craft. As the example of the “misapplied” 
lessons from Kosovo in East Timor demonstrates, finding the right balance between 
generalization and context-specificity is a constant challenge. Training programs can 
contribute to improving this craft. Investing in people is a crucial component of 
strengthening the overall learning capacity of the UN peacebuilding apparatus. 
 
Given what the often invoked international community has achieved so far in the area of 
peacebuilding, modesty and self-reflection are in order. At the same time, this is a call to 
intensify our efforts at “learning to learn”. As Ernst Haas, the pioneer of the study of 
organizational learning in international organizations, put it: “There is never a final lesson 
to be learned.”158 Haas’ dictum holds true for both researchers and policymakers.  
 
                                                 
157  In addition, the newly created Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) aspires to “gather and analyze information rela-
ting to […] best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues.” (UN Security Council, 2005). As of now, 
the workplan for the PBSO is unclear. In case, the PBSO develops any activities on our four focal issues we would 
also include this in our research. 
158 Haas, 1990.  
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (UN) 
ASG Assistant Secretary-General 
BSU Boundary-spanning Unit(s) 
CIVPOL Civilian police 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
DPA Department of Political Affairs (UN) 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) 
DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
ECHA Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (UN) 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN) 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ECPS Executive Committee on Peace and Security (UN) 
EISAS ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat 
ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator 
EU European Union 
FC Force Commander 
GA General Assembly (UN) 
HC Humanitarian Coordinator (OCHA) 
ICG International Crisis Group 
IFOR Implementation Force (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
IMPP Integrated Mission Planning Process 
IMTF Integrated Mission Task Force 
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization 
INTERFET International Force for East Timor 
IPTF International Police Task Force (part of UNMIBH) 
IO International Organization 
IR International Relations (as a discipline) 
JMAC Joint Mission Assessment Cell (in UN peacebuilding missions) 
KM Knowledge Management 
LLU Lessons Learned Unit (DPKO) 
MILOB Military Observer 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) 
OHR Office of the High Representative (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
OL Organizational Learning 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PBPS Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (UN DPKO) 
PBPU Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (UN DPKO) 
PBC Peacebuilding Commission (UN) 
PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office (UN) 
PC Police Commander 
PMSS Personnel Management and Support Service (UN DPKO) 
RC Resident Coordinator (UNDP) 
SC Security Council (UN) 
SFOR Stabilization Force (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
UN United Nations 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
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UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq 
UNAMET United Nations Mission to East Timor 
UNAMSIL United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone 
UNCT United Nations Country Team 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone 
UNMIBH United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
UNMIL United Nations Mission to Liberia 
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
UNOHCI United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq 
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia 
UNOTIL United Nations Office in Timor-Leste 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UNTAES United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia 
UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group (in Namibia) 
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
USG Under-Secretary-General 
WFP World Food Programme 
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List of Interviews 
 
Mr Salman AHMED 
Acting Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations 
United Nations Secretariat, New York, 25 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Melanie ATWOOLL 
Adviser, Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations 
New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Mr Dominik BARTSCH 
Senior Policy Adviser, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, and Transition Team for the Peacebuilding Support Office 
United Nations Secretariat, New York, 24 April 2006 (in person) 
Dr Jamal BENOMAR 
Senior Advisor, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
United Nations Development Programme, New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Dr Simon CHESTERMAN 
Executive Director, Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University 
NYU School of Law, New York, 25 April 2006 (in person) 
Mr Michael CHRISTENSEN 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations 
New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Prof Michael DOYLE 
Harold Brown Professor for United States Foreign and Security Policy, School of 
International and Public Affairs and School of Law, Columbia University 
New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Ambassador Rainer EBERLE 
Deputy Director-General, Global Issues, the United Nations, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Aid, German Foreign Office 
Berlin, 16 August 2006 (in person) 
Mr Sebastian VON EINSIEDEL 
Special Assistant to the President, International Peace Academy 
New York, 24 April 2006 (in person) 
Mr Scott GILMORE 
Executive Director, Peace Dividend Trust 
New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Mr Andrew GILMOUR 
Deputy Political Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General 
United Nations Secretariat, New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Michèle GRIFFIN 
Political Affairs Officer, Policy Planning Unit, Department of Political Affairs 
United Nations Secretariat, New York, 25 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Julia Katharina GROSS 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations 
New York, 25 April 2006 (in person) 
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Ms Joanna HARVEY 
Coordination Officer, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, United Nations Secretariat, New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Heidi HULAN 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations 
New York, 24 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Eiko IKEGAYA 
Research Officer, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, United Nations Secretariat, New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Dr Bruce JONES 
Co-Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University 
New York, 25 April 2006 (in person) 
Mr Paul KEATING 
Political Affairs Officer, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, United Nations Secretariat, New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Yoonie KIM 
Adviser, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
United Nations Development Programme, New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Joanna MOIR 
First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations 
New York, 24 April 2006 (in person) 
Mr Thomas W. OHLSON 
Adviser, Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations 
New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Sir Kieran PRENDERGAST  
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, United Nations, retired 
Cambridge/MA, 4 November 2005 (in person) 
Mr Edward REES 
Coordination Officer, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, United Nations Secretariat, New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Nicole RUDER 
First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations 
New York, 24 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Laurie SHESTACK 
Adviser, Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations 
New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
Ms Fatemeh ZIAI 
Acting Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, United Nations Secretariat, New York, 26 April 2006 (in person) 
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